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Abstract. On-board Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)
systems are considered to ensure the safety and to increase the auton-
omy of spacecrafts. They shall be carefully designed and validated. Their
implementation involves a relevant knowledge of items like functions and
architectures of the system, and a fault model in relation with these
items. Thus, the event-B method is well suited to correctly specify and
validate on-board safety architectures.
This paper focuses on the FDIR concept presentation and the use of
event-B for formalising and for refining the FDIR concept.
1 Introduction
On-board Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) systems aim at main-
taining the safe spacecraft operation even when faults occur. They also enable to
limit service interruptions with reduced ground operations. So, they contribute
to the spacecraft autonomy.
They are complex systems composed of various mechanisms, ranging from the
monitoring and activation of basic physical devices to the reconfiguration of the
spacecraft mission. They are often structured in layers to master this complexity.
One issue is to characterize and validate each layer and the relationship between
each layer.
These characteristics require a rigorous and progressive validation of the
system from the early phases of design by discharging proof obligations. Accord-
ingly, it is necessary to use a formal method like event-B for the modelling and
proof.
This paper focuses on the FDIR concept presentation and the use of event-B
for formalising and for refining the FDIR concept.
The paper is organised as follows: after a short presentation of on-board
FDIR concept strongly bounded with autonomy architecture concept, the next
section suggest activities enabling to implement FDIR concept. Then, we present
the framework of formal modelling that we will use to describe our architecture
and the properties related to this architecture. The last section deals with the
objectives for the future work.
22 FDIR concept
FDIR is the means to detect off-nominal conditions, isolate the problem to a
specific subsystem/component, and recover of vehicle systems and capabilities
[1]. In this paper, FDIR is considered as an operational function that contributes
to the autonomy of the system and whose main purpose is to maintain the avail-
ability and the safety of the system [2].
The main activities related to FDIR design concern:
– identification of fault-classes that could impact the requested availability and
safety objectives;
– proposition of a strategy in order to tolerate above fault-classes. A strategy
suggests a logical solution to achieve these objectives;
– implementation of this strategy by proposing a static and dynamic architec-
ture: combining functional components with safety components for diagnosis
and reconfiguration.
One difficulty is often the lack of traceability between these activities. The strat-
egy that gave the rationales of the architecture is left implicit. The proposed
architecture is often the result of expert judgement. So it is hard to prove the
consistency between the objectives and the architecture. Therefore our proposi-
tion is to model the objectives of the concerned system using event-B method. We
first model some strategies or patterns of safety that allow to meet requirements
described in the objectives of the system. Then, we show how these patterns are
refined rigorously in concrete architectures by discharging proof obligations.
3 Work in progress using event-B method
Event-B is a formal method for the development of complex system. Its formal-
ism supports the validation of some properties thanks to proof methods. Thanks
to these distinctive features, the event-B method is well suited to correctly spec-
ify and progressively validate on-board safety architectures.
Let us illustrate how the three activities are modelled in event-B. For mis-
sion objectives of a spacecraft, two feared events are identified: the spacecraft
loss and the interruption the mission. Safety architecture patterns propose micro
architecture solutions that enable to mitigate such feared events. We propose to
reuse and extend the patterns presented in [3].
For this paper, we model more specifically a safety architecture pattern that
includes a primary functional component and a redundant one, under the hy-
pothesis of no common fault. The safety property to be met is: “one single fault
shall not lead to the total loss of the function”. We modelled this pattern at
three abstraction levels successively refined which verify this property.
3The most abstract model enables to formalise this property and hypothesis.
Two basic components are considered. A fault counter (fault ci, with i stands
for 1 or 2) is associated to each component, whereas a boolean status (status)
models the global system health. When a fault occurs (event disci, with i stands
for 1 or 2), the component “i” is considered disconnected. When the event fi-
nal occurs, nothing more happens, since the system remains in the faulty state.
Moreover, for all this behaviour, the safety property is expressed by an invariant:
card(fault c1) + card(fault c2) ≤ 1⇔ status = TRUE. But at this step, there
is no detail about the condition of spare component activation.
Accordingly, the second model refines the former with introduction of the
switching process as a strategy. The activation variables are set in this new
model. Two new events are defined: sw1 2 event allows to switch from the pri-
mary active component to the spare component which becomes active when the
primary one is disengaged; sw2 event disconnects the system by disconnecting
the secondary component.
At least, the third model is an implementation of this switching strategy by
taking into account data flow: normal1 (respectively normal2) event represents
the “normal” data flow of the primary (respectively, the spare) component ac-
cording to the specification; fail1 (respectively fail2) event represents the “faulty”
data flow of the primary (respectively, the spare) component.
4 Future work
The current work investigates B-event specifications and refinements of generic
FDIR strategies by using the RODIN platform. The future work will consist
in studying the impact of the concept of a “layered” FDIR and how it can be
modelled and validated in the B-event framework, in the same spirit than the
full constructive approach developed by [4].
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